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Abstract. We employ German Sample Survey Income data to examine income inequality and 
the financial situation of elderly citizens for the period from 1978 to 2003, focussing on 
differences between retired and non-retired elderly and between elderly with residence in the 
Old and the New German  Laender.  Inter-temporal changes in income inequality  are  also 
decomposed  by  income  sources.  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  study  that  provides 
comparable and detailed longitudinal income statistics for the German elderly. We find some 
remarkable inter-temporal patterns. First, the financial situation of the elderly has improved 
substantially over time. This is true especially for the New Laender, although elderly with 
residence in the Old Laender remain financially privileged. Within the same age cohort, we 
also find that non-retired, on average, are financially better-off compared to retired elderly. 
For reunified Germany, inequality is astonishingly stable over time, but rises significantly 
since 1993 in the New German Laender.  
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1 Introduction 
This study investigates the financial situation of German elderly, being defined as persons age 
55 and older, during two and a half decades from year 1978 to 2003. Amongst other reasons, 
this era is interesting as several regulations of the statutory German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
old age pension system have been modified. In the late 1970s, the German pension system 
was expanded to one of the World’s most generous ones, both in terms of replacement rates 
and early retirement provisions. Despite distinct GDP growth, a raising fiscal imbalance – 
driven by population ageing, German reunification and high unemployment rates in the mid 
1980
th, in the 1990
th and early 2000
th – served as an argument to scale down the pension 
system. Several measures have been implemented, encompassing, amongst others, a raise of 
the eligibility age, replacement-rate reductions, and subsidies for private old-age provisions. 
An overview of 12 major reforms between 1977 and 2003 can be found in the Appendix (see 
Table  A1).  Since  2003,  further  reforms  have  been  implemented  or  are  currently  being 
discussed. These reform measures are likely to have pervasive implications for the financial 
situation of the future elderly. Taking a stock of the financial situation of the elderly in recent 
years and in the past, therefore, can provide a useful yardstick for taxing the costs and benefits 
of the ongoing reform processes. 
However, it is an open question as to who benefited or lost how much, and what the 
implications for inequality are. We provide representative data on the financial situation of the 
elderly,  also  decomposed  by  different  age  cohorts,  by  retirement  status  (yes/no),  and  by 
residence (New vs. Old German Laender). More precisely, for the entire time horizon and for 
each sample, we examine material well-being in terms of equivalent incomes, and also how 
much different income sources contribute to equivalent income and to inequality. To the best 
of  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  study  providing  harmonized  and  detailed  longitudinal 
statistics on income inequality among German elderly and their financial situation. 
We find some remarkable inter-temporal patterns. First, the financial situation of the 
elderly,  measured  by  means  of  price-adjusted  gross  equivalent  income,  has  improved 
substantially over time. Interestingly, it turns out that income growth was rather stable over 
time in case of the retired, but quite volatile, and mirroring the German business cycles, in 
case of the non-retired elderly. In this sense, the German pension system has been an effective 
insurance  device  against  aggregate  GDP  shocks.  Second,  the  non-retired  are  financially 
better-off compared to the retired elderly, and the same holds for those with residence in the 
Old compared to those with residence in the New German Laender. Concerning the issue of 
income inequality, the distribution of equivalent incomes turns out to be rather flat among   3 
elderly households. For example, comparing average equivalent incomes in the fourth (eight) 
and the first decile in 2003, the ratio is 1.93 (3.25) only. The income composition of high- and 
low income elderly, however, is rather different. During the whole period, retirement pensions 
from public pension fund and social benefits account for about 80 percent of total equivalent 
income in the first decile, but only for about 8 percent in the tenth decile. The group of elderly 
with high incomes is still active in the labour market, disposes of capital, or has been civil 
servants in their active period. For reunified Germany, inequality is astonishingly stable over 
time, but we find a significant increase of inequality since 1993 in the New German Laender. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses candidate 
German databases and results from previous studies. Section 3 explains the technical details 
regarding  the  data  processing.  In  Section  4  we  briefly  explain  the  inequality  measures 
employed in the empirical analysis that follows in Section 5. The final section contains some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2 Candidate databases and results from previous studies 
Our  study  is  based  on  six  cross  sections  of  the  German  Sample  Survey  of  Income  and 
Expenditure (EVS), collected in years 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003. The EVS is 
provided  by  the  German  Statistical  Office,  conducted  at  5-year  intervals,  and  contains 
representative household-level income, wealth, and consumption data.
2 The sizes of the cross 
sections  range  between  40,000  to  60,000  observations  (household  units).  An  important 
advantage compared to  several other German databases is that the EVS encompasses the 
entire elderly population, both the non-retired and the retired. Yet, the EVS also suffers from 
some  limitations:  persons  living  in  communal  establishments  and  institutions,  and  also 
households with a monthly net household income exceeding a threshold income, e.g., EUR 
18,000 in year 2003, are not included.
3  
  Previous  studies  concerning  the  financial  situation  of  the  German  elderly  usually 
provide rather aggregated statistics, in general referring to a single period. Most related to 
ours is the work of Börsch-Supan et al. (2001) who compute average incomes of the elderly, 
decomposed by several age cohorts and household types, and also some aggregate income-
inequality indicators. Their analysis is static, restricted to EVS 1993. For EVS 1993 and EVS 
1998, aggregate statistics on pensioners’ incomes, wealth and consumption are provided by 
                                                 
2 For further information, see German Federal Statistical Office (2007a). 
3 According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2007a), the number of top-income households participating 
in the EVS is not sufficient to provide reliable information. Income cut-offs for earlier periods (in prices of 2003) 
are: €18,811 in 1978; €18,546 in 1983; €17,497 in 1988; €20,788 in 1993; €19,131 in 1998.   4 
Münnich (2001).  Schnabel (1999) estimates life-cycle incomes based on four EVS cross 
sections (1978 to 1993) combined with social security data. Income inequality, however, is 
not an issue of Schnabel’s study.  
Frommert and Heien (2006) study the role of the German statutory pension insurance 
for old age income, Kirner et al. (2000) the linkages between pension-system financing modes 
and old age income security. They employ AVID – ‘Altersvorsorge in Deutschland’ (Old-Age 
Provision in Germany). AVID provides micro-level data on types and amounts of entitlements 
to old-age incomes for the non-retired population only. For this reason, AVID is inappropriate 
for  status-quo  and  retrospective  analyses  such  as  ours.
4  ‘ASID,’  ‘Alterssicherung  in 
Deutschland’  (‘Old  Age  Insurance  in  Germany’)  is  a  complementary  database  to  AVID, 
providing information about the incomes of the population age 55 and above.
5 Yet, so far, 
only  three  waves  (1992,  1995,  and  1999)  are  publicly  available.  The  ‘Pension  Access 
Statistic’  (Rentenzugangsstatistik)  of  the  ‘German  Pension  Insurance’  (Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung)  only  contains  micro-level  data  on  households  with  members  being 
entitled to public pensions. 
Employing German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) data,
6 Siddiqui (1997) simulates 
the  effects  of  the  German  1992  Pension  Reform  Act  on  the  frequency  distribution  of 
retirement ages using a discrete-time hazard model. Siddiqui (1997, p. 482, Table 4) predicts, 
already in the short run, an increase in the average age of retirement. Berkel and Börsch-
Supan (2003) expect similar effects.  Our data do not provide evidence in favour of their 
predictions. With GSOEP data, Mantovani et al. (2005) investigate the impacts of alternative 
pension reforms on old age poverty rates, Schwarze and Frick (2000) the distribution among 
the elderly from the mid-1980
th to the mid-1990
th. Schwarze and Frick find inequality to be 
U-shaped over time, and slightly increasing in more recent years of the observation period. 
On the opposite, we find a slight decrease for the same period. Yet, several technical details 
make  their  analysis  incommensurable  with  ours,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  income 
concept: disposable income in case of Schwarze and Frick (2000) vs. pre-tax post transfers in 
our case.  
Finally,  Börsch-Supan  et  al.  (2005)  and  Hallberg  (2006)  calculate  inequality  and 
poverty indices for the German elderly using the ‘Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
                                                 
4  The  ‘Federation  of  German  Statutory  Pension  Insurance  Institutions’  (‘Verband  Deutscher 
Rentenversicherungsträger’, ‘Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund’ since 2005) (VDR) and the German Federal 
Ministry  for  Labour  and  Social  Affairs  commissioned  the  Institute  of  Social  Research  (‘TNS  Infratest 
Sozialforschung’) to carry out the AVID surveys 1996 and 2005. See TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2007a) and 
(2007b). 
5 Further details are provided in Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires (2005). 
6 For a detailed description of the GSOEP database see German Institute for Economic Research (2007).   5 
Europe’ (SHARE). SHARE is a cross-country micro-level database of individuals age 50 or 
older.
7  Unfortunately,  up  until  now  only  a  single  cross  section  in  year  2004  has  been 
collected. 
 
3 Data processing and harmonization  
For each year, our database of elderly subjects is a subset of all EVS households, restricted to 
persons age 55 and older. A minority of these elderly subjects had to be excluded from the 
database for technical reasons. First, intra-familiar relationships remain unclear in some cases. 
This especially applies to households with three or more elderly. Second, income sources 
sometimes can not be assigned to the household members without extra assumptions. To 
reduce the inaccuracies resulting from these obstacles, only the first two elderly persons from 
every household unit are included in our database. The eliminated fraction of elderly persons 
due to this procedure is small, e.g., 4.3 percent in 2003. Another concern is over- and under-
sampling. Compared with the German micro-census, EVS over-samples people in their 70ies 
on the account of subjects age 80 and older. To fit the German micro-census statistics, we 
have re-weighted the EVS data according to the entropy based minimum information loss 
principle.
8 
  We distinguish several types of elderly subjects. If, in our database, a subject draws 
retirement or civil servant’s pensions we call her a ‘pensioner;’ else a ‘non-pensioner.’ This 
differentiation should effectively distinguish subjects who draw retirement or civil servant’s 
pensions from subjects that do not. Of course, several other options for differentiation exist. 
Labour  market  withdrawal,  lack  of  earnings,  receipt  of  retirement  incomes,  and  age  are 
typical criteria to define pensioner/retirement units. Alternative definitions of retirement and 
their  empirical  implications  are  discussed  in  Smeeding  (1990).  For  Germany,  see  also 
Münnich (2001) and Münnich and Illgen (2000).   
Furthermore, we distinguish subjects with residence in the Old from subjects with 
residence in the New German Laender, and split the sample in two age cohorts. The cohort 
‘C1’ consists of all subjects age 55 to 64; ‘C2’ encompasses all subjects age 65 and older. 
Unweighted numbers of observations for the different sub-samples are provided in Table A2 
of the Appendix. Those figures indicate small sample sizes in case of the sub-sample of non-
pensioners belonging to cohort C2, especially in case of the New Laender. Deaton and Paxson 
(1994, p. 441), however, argue that even small sample sizes (34 households in their study) 
                                                 
7 See http://www.share-project.org/ for further information. 
8 Details on the re-weighting procedure can be provided by the authors upon request.   6 
should give “fairly accurate measures of inequality.” According to their assessment, number 
of  observations  in  our  study  should  be  sufficient  except  for  the  New  Laender  C2  non-
pensioner sub-sample. 
Income reported throughout this paper is yearly, ‘pre-tax-post-transfer’ equivalent income 
in prices of year 2003.
9 For each EVS cross section, Table A4 in the Appendix summarizes 
the EVS variables pertaining to each income source. Obviously, income variables in one 
survey do not necessarily coincide with those in another survey. Subject to this technical 
limitation, we have computed the following income concepts:  
•   ‘incomes from employment:’ earned income and self-employed income; 
•  ‘old-age  pensions:’  retirement  pensions  from  public  pension  fund,  civil  servant’s 
pensions, company pensions, and other pensions; 
•  ‘transfers:’ benefits related to former employment, social assistance, family-related 
benefits, and other transfers; 
•  ‘income on investments,’ and  
•  ‘other  incomes,’  which  is  a  residual  component  that  cannot  unambiguously  be 
assigned to the previous five income concepts. 
The  definition  of  a  ‘pre-tax-post-transfer’  equivalent  income  requires  several  technical 
assumptions. First, as we want to ‘control’ for changes in the financial situation of other 
(younger)  household  members,  individual  incomes  received  by  non-elderly  household 
members are ignored. This is in line with the income concept suggested in Johnson and Stears 
(1996). Second, not all incomes are available at the individual level but at the household-level. 
This problem applies, especially, to ‘other incomes’ and ‘income on investments.’ Let the size 
of the original EVS household unit be n, then we add  n 1 th of the same income source to the 
sum of individual incomes of each of its members,
10 giving a ‘total individual income.’ Third, 
to account for the fact that two-member elderly households can benefit from economies of 
household size and income pooling, we transform individual income into the one-member 
household’s welfare ‘equivalent income.’ This is the sum of ‘total individual incomes’ of the 
elderly household members divided by the modified OECD equivalence scale, which is 1.5 
                                                 
9 Incomes of EVS cross sections 1978-1988 have been adjusted using consumer-price for the Old Laender. After 
the German reunification, consumer price indices for the whole of Germany have been employed. All indices are 
taken from the German Federal Statistical Office (2007b), and are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.  
10 For further details see the technical explanations in Table A4.   7 
for a couple and 1.0 for the solitary elderly.
11 Equivalent income is then assigned to each 
elderly person.  
As the number of elderly persons living in an EVS household unit is not necessarily 
concordant  with  the  number  of  all  household  members,  our  income  concept  might 
underestimate the true level of household-size economies and underestimate the access to 
financial resources. For example, elderly living with younger high income recipients may 
benefit from intra-household income pooling. In this sense, our income concept is only a 
lower bound for the ‘true’ level of material comfort. By contrast, our income concept controls 
for changes in household arrangements and incomes of younger subjects when making inter-
temporal comparisons of income. 
One might also argue that a pre-tax-post-transfer income concept is a biased estimate of 
peoples ‘true’ living standards, as consumption and saving ultimately depend on post-tax-
post-transfer income.
12 Yet, observations in our database usually cannot be treated as tax 
units, and computing post-tax-post-transfer income (especially for different income sources) 
would urge us to make strong assumptions on individual tax liabilities. Finally, pre-tax-post-
transfer  income  is  less  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  tax  code,  and  thus  might  be  a  better 
indicator for assessing the impacts of previous pension reforms on the financial situation of 
the elderly. 
 
4 Gini decomposition by income sources 
Our inequality measure is the Gini coefficient, G, twice the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the uniform distribution line. The Lorenz curve is obtained by sorting all elderly persons 
in increasing order of equivalent income. Hence, the Lorenz curve displays the percentage of 
total  equivalent  income  for  the  bottom  x%  of  the  elderly  population.  Typically,  several 
income sources determine individual income, and respective income shares might alter as we 
move from the bottom to the top of the distribution. A decomposition analysis by income 
sources, therefore, might provide interesting insights.  
We  proceed  by  briefly  summarizing  the  Gini  decomposition  by  income  sources 
suggested in Rao (1969).
13 Let  ( ) I i i ,..., 1 =  be an income source, and  i    mean equivalent 
                                                 
11 This conversion is in line with the OECD modified equivalence scale. It assigns a value of 1.0 to the one-
member household, an increment of 0.5 to each additional adult household member. See OECD (2007) for 
details and alternative sets of equivalence scales. 
12 The suitability of different income concepts from a welfare perspective is discussed in Podder and Chatterjee 
(2002). 
13 Our presentation is a brief summary of the analysis outlined in Podder (1993) and and Podder and Chatterjee 
(2002), where further details are provided.   8 
income of source i. Total average equivalent income is represented by    . Then      / i i w =  
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1
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where  i C  is the concentration coefficient of i. The concentration coefficient is twice the area 
between the concentration curve and the uniform distribution line. As the concentration curve 
of i is derived by sorting all observations in ascending order of total equivalent income – and 
not by the equivalent income of source  i, the concentration coefficient range is  ( ) 1 , 1 − . It is, 
therefore, the spread of an income source over the range of total equivalent income that 
determines whether that source has an inequality increasing or decreasing effect. 
The impact of a change in mean equivalent income of i on G can best be captured by 
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The Gini elasticity  i η  gives the percentage change in the Gini coefficient with respect to a 
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0. If  ( ) 0 > −G Ci , the effect of income source  ion G is positive, i.e., it has 
an inequality-augmenting effect. Correspondingly, if  ( ) 0 < −G Ci , income source  i has an 
inequality-reducing effect. From (1) it can also be seen that an income source affects total 
inequality through two different channels: (a) through its relative share in total equivalent 
income,  i w ; (b) through its spread over the range of total equivalent income,  i C . The changes 
in  i w ,  i C  and G between two periods t and  x t − , can be examined by,  
 
( ) x t t t G G G − − =   3 . 
 
Let  x t i t i t i w w w − − =   , , ,  be the change in the share of income source i between periods t and 
x t − . Moreover, let the change in the concentration coefficient of income source  i between 
the same two periods be  x t i t i t i C C C − − =   , , , . If  i w  and  i C  are functions of time, the total 
derivative of (3) equals 
   9 






































































14 Equation (5) decomposes the change in the Gini coefficient over two 
periods  in  two  components.  The  sum∑
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  is  the  change  of  the  Gini 
coefficient as a result of changes in the shares of different income sources in total equivalent 
income, the ‘share effect.’ The second term, ∑
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, quantifies the impact of 
changes in the concentration coefficients on overall inequality, the ‘concentration effect.’
15 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 A snapshot for year 2003 
Financial situation 
The first row of Table 1 gives the average equivalent incomes for 2003 for the whole sample 
and for each sub-sample. Underneath, we report the equivalent income shares of the five main 
income sources (rows entitled “total share”), and for constituting income sub-aggregates. The 
figures  reveal  that,  on  average,  non-pensioners  are  financially  better-off  compared  to 
pensioners, and the same applies, as one would expect, to elderly living in the Old compared 
to those with residence in the New Laender. In case of non-pensioners the OL/NL difference 
in equivalent income is in particular high, about €15,423. Also the income composition is 
specific to the place of residence. Ceteris paribus, elderly in the New Laender rely much more 
on public transfers. For example, in case of pensioners (non-pensioners) in the New Laender, 
the  income  share  of  ‘retirement  pensions  from  social  security’  (‘transfers  total  share’) 
amounts to 76.33% (15.64%), compared with only 42.31% (4.29%) in the Old Laender. The 
opposite holds for ‘income from investments.’ In the Old Lander, the respective income share 
is about eight percentage points higher (17.30% compared with 9.13%). Most interestingly, 
                                                 
14  Podder  and  Chatterjee  (2002,  p.  8)  have  suggested  an  averaging  of  the  two  periods’  estimates  as  a 
“compromise – and for a better approximation,” as the changes can both be measured with respect to period t  or 
with respect to  1 − t .  
15 See Podder and Chatterjee (2002, p. 8) for details.   10 
despite 13 years of German reunification, New Laender elderly still do not receive significant 
‘civil  servant’s  pensions’  or  ‘company  pensions.’  These  patterns  are  also  reconfirmed  by 
Table 2, where conditional means of the respective income source are reported.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
  Yet, maybe there is evidence of OL/NL convergence in case of the ‘younger’ cohort. 
To investigate this possibility, Table 3 provides cohort specific statistics on the  financial 
situation of the elderly. Cohort C1 encompasses all individuals age 55 to 64, and C2 all 
individuals age 65 and older. But also for the younger cohort, OL/NL differences remain 
substantial. On average, equivalent income in cohort C1 in the Old Laender is €11,236 higher, 
even €15,508 higher in case of non-pensioners. The cohort C1 with residence in the New 
Laender also relies more on public transfers. The figures also suggest that, with the single 
exception being New Laender pensioners, the cohort C1 is financially better-off compared 
with C2. Reasons for this include a higher labour market participation rate in C1, as mirrored 
in high levels of ‘earned income’ and ‘self-employed income.’ 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Average equivalent incomes tell little about the income distribution among the elderly. 
Table  4,  therefore,  provides  decile  specific  estimates  of  equivalent  incomes  and  income 
shares. The entries are computed by arranging the elderly in ascending order of equivalent 
income. For each decile, the first row of Table 4 gives mean equivalent income. Income 
shares are reported underneath. Altogether, the income distribution is rather flat. For example, 
the ratio of average equivalent incomes for the fourth and the first decile is 1.92 only, and 
4.10 for the ninth and the first decile. When moving from the bottom to the top of the income 
distribution, the income composition systematically changes. Whereas ‘retirement pensions 
from social pension fund’ (64.74%) and transfers (14.87%) have a share of about 80% in total 
equivalent income in the first decile, the fraction steadily drops to 8.63% in the tenth decile.
 
Otherwise, the share of work-related incomes (‘self-employed income’ and ‘earned income’) 
rises  from  4.54%  in  the  first  to  40.13%  in  the  tenth  decile.  The  income  share  of  ‘civil 
servant’s pensions’ increases from 0.58% to 13.63%, and from 7.68% to 17.95% in case of   11 
‘income on investments.’ Summing up, the financially better-off are still active in the labour 
market, dispose of capital, or have formerly been civil servants.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
  Table 5 portraits the composition of the sample over the income distribution. For each 






, with  NP N  being the number of non-pensioners. This ratio first increases and then 
decreases when moving from the bottom to top of the income distribution. In fact, the fraction 
of pensioners is rather low at the two margins of the distribution, with a peak in the third and 






,  are  given  in  column  two.  It  is  transparent  that  Old  Laender  elderly  are 
overrepresented in the higher deciles. The last column of Table 5 gives the decile-specific 








, indicating that cohort C1 is over-
represented at the two tails of the income distribution. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Income inequality 
Year 2003 Gini estimates are summarized in Table 6. These estimates indicate a remarkable 
OL-NL difference in inequality of 9.14 Gini points for the whole sample (column ‘pensioners 
& non pensioners’). To some extent, low inequality in the New Laender may echo a flat 
income distribution in the former German Democratic Republic. Yet, also the share of non-
pensioners, among whom inequality is especially high, is rather small in the New Laender.  
Cohort-specific Gini indices indicate higher inequality among pensioners of cohort 
C1. We will further comment on this finding in the next paragraph. However, the opposite is 
true for the sub-sample of non-pensioners. Here, the Gini coefficient related to cohort C2 is 
15.88 points higher.
16 A more thoroughly investigation of the socio-economic characteristics 
of C2 non-pensioners helps explaining the huge difference. Among C2 non-pensioners, there 
                                                 
16 The Gini coefficient of 5.65 for C2 non-pensioners with residence in the New Laender is owed to the rather 
small number of observations for this sub-sample.   12 
is  a  number  of  rather  rich  self-employees  (6.29%  of  the  observations)  with  an  average 
equivalent income from self employment of €68,193.59, and a number of rather poor subjects 
predominantly relying on social welfare (57.06% of the observations). 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The results of the Gini decomposition by income sources are summarized in Table 7. 
For  each  income  source  and  for  each  of  its  sub-aggregates,  the  respective  concentration 
coefficient is reported. ‘Income from employment,’ ‘other incomes,’ as well as ‘income on 
investments’  turn  out  to  be  inequality-augmenting  (for  these  income  sources,  G Ci > ). 
‘Incomes from employment’ has the highest concentration coefficient, followed by ‘other 
incomes’  and  ‘income  on  investments.’  In  particularly  ‘transfers’  but  also  ‘retirement 
incomes’ are inequality-reducing. This finding is reconfirmed for all sub-samples.  
The estimates concerning the income sub-aggregates reveal several additional insights. 
First, the inequality-reducing effect of ‘total retirement income’ is solely driven by ‘retirement 
pensions  from  public  pension  fund,’  whereas  ‘civil  servant’s  pensions,’  eminently  boost 
inequality.  The  inequality-reducing  effect  of  ‘transfers,’  above  all,  is  due  to  ‘social 
assistance,’ whereas concentration coefficients of ‘family related transfers’ and ‘total incomes 
from employment’ are about equally high. An interesting finding concerns the estimates for 
elderly from the Old and New Laender. Typically, estimates in the Old Laender are higher, 
consistent with the OL-NL Gini index difference. ‘Income on investments,’ however, exhibits 
a higher coefficient in the New Laender. This is in line with the ‘income on investments’ 
estimates provided in Table 1 and Table 2:  In the New Laender, the share of elderly actually 
drawing some ‘income on investments’ is rather small.  
Informative as they are, concentration coefficients can only partly explain the overall 
picture. The impacts of changes in particular income sources on inequality can be measured 
by means of Gini elasticities,  i η s, provided in Table 8. As explained earlier, the Gini elasticity 
pertaining to income source i gives the percentage change in the Gini coefficient with respect 
to a percentage change in equivalent income of source  i. All Gini elasticities reported in 
Table  8  are  stated  in  percent.  Concerning  the  entire  sample,  an  increase  in  ‘retirement 
pensions  from  public  pension  fund’  causes  the  most  significant  decrease  of  the  Gini 
coefficient,  indicating  its  potential  relevance  for  policies  concerned  with  old-age  income 
inequality.  The  same  applies  to  ‘benefits  related  to  former  employment’  in  case  of  non-
pensioners with residence in the New Laender. On the contrary, elasticities with respect to   13 
‘earned  income’  followed  by  ‘civil  servant’s  pensions’  and  ‘income  on  investments’  are 
usually high and positive.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
 
5.2 Inter-temporal changes of incomes and inequality 
Financial situation  
Table 9 shows the inter-temporal changes in the financial situation in terms of income growth 
rates. All entries are mean equivalent incomes in prices of year 2003. Figures in rows 1-3 
(rows  4-6)  are  income  growth  rates  comparing  years  1993  and  2003  (1978  and  2003). 
Underneath, growth rates for consecutive cross sections are reported. All numbers indicate a 
substantial  improvement  of  the  financial  situation  of  German  elderly.  Between  1978  and 
2003, average equivalent income of an elderly person grew by 37.60% in case of the Old 
Laender. In reunified Germany, the increase was 15.57% between 1993 and 2003. Different 
sub-samples experienced quite different income growth. In case of pensioners, growth rates, 
for example, are clearly higher compared to non-pensioners, and the same applies to cohort 
C2 compared to C1. Growth paths in the Old and New German Laender differ as well, and 
indicate a substantial catch-up process to the benefit of New Laender elderly. Between 1993 
and 2003, incomes in the New Laender grew by 33.18% compared to 13.59% in the Old 
Laender. Another interesting finding concerns the inter-temporal volatility of growth rates. 
Except for the period 1978 to 1983, pensioners experienced rather stable income growth, 
about 8% within a 5-years period. By contrast, income growth rates of non-pensioners are 
rather volatile and typically mimic the German business cycle. In combination, these two 
patterns suggest an insurance effect of the German pension system against cyclical income 
variations over the business cycle.  
 
Table 9 about here 
 
Income  inequality 
Table 10 provides Gini coefficients for each of our cross sections. For reunified Germany, 
there are no apparent systematic changes in inequality since reunification. Results are more 
sophisticated if we decompose the sample by residence. Regarding the Old Laender elderly, 
inequality is slightly on the decline from 1993 to 2003, continuing a slight tendency already   14 
transparent before reunification. This result is reconfirmed in case of Old Laender pensioners, 
whereas  inequality  remains  remarkably  stable  among  Old  Laender  non-pensioners. 
Concerning the latter, Gini coefficients in 1978 and 2003 differ by 0.94 points only. The 
picture  in  the  New  Laender  is  rather  different.  Here,  inequality  is  on  the  rise  since 
reunification.  Taking  New  Laender  pensioners  as  an  example,  the  increase  of  the  Gini 
coefficient is 15.70%; and 19.89% in case of non-pensioners. Another robust finding across 
all samples and periods in unison is the higher levels of inequality for cohort C1 compared 
with cohort C2. This is due to the higher share of ‘incomes from employment’ in case of 
cohort C1, a rather unequally distributed income source (see Table 3 in combination with 
Table 7).  
 
Table 10 about here 
 
For the better understanding of the driving forces behind these patterns, Tables 11a-c provide 
an inter-temporal inequality decomposition by income sources. As explained in Section 4, 
inequality can be decomposed into the changes in the income shares of different income 
sources and the changes in the inequality within the income sources themselves. So, we can 
investigate inter-temporal differences in overall inequality by quantifying, for each income 
source,  the  differences  of  income  shares  and  of  concentration  coefficients  for  any  two 
consecutive periods,  t and  5 − t . In order to keep the analysis tractable, we forbear from 
reporting cohort-specific estimates.
17  
  We comment on the period since reunification first. Most remarkably is the sharp 
decrease in the share of ‘retirement incomes,’ falling by 2.59 percentage points from 51.14% 
between 1993 and 1998, and then increasing again by 6.74 percentage points between 1998 
and 2003. However, we would like to stress that the conditional means of different sources of 
‘retirement  incomes’  remained  rather  stable  over  the  same  decade.  For  example,  PAYG 
‘retirement incomes’ (‘civil servant’s pensions’) in year 1993 amount to €10,557 (€18,843), 
€11,396 (€19,482) in 1998, and €12,439 (€20,819) in 2003. Hence, changes in the share of 
‘retirement  incomes’  must  be  put  down  to  other  causes:  (a)  a  change  in  the  sample 
composition, scrutinized in the last paragraph of this section; (b) changes in the shares of 
other income sources. Indeed, from 1993 to 1998, the share of ‘income on investments’ rises 
by about 1 percentage point (continuing, for the Old Laender, a positive trend dating back to 
1988), and, in 2003, falls back to about its original 1993 level. This is in concordance with the 
long  run  trend  of  the  German  stock  index  (DAX).  Between  1988  and  1993,  the  DAX 
                                                 
17 Cohort specific results can be provided by the authors upon request.   15 
experienced a 46.7 percent growth, even 120.6 percent between 1993 and 1998. Between 
1998 and 2003, the DAX incurred a loss of 20.7 percent of its value.
18 The drop of the 
‘income from employment’ share is a mirror image of rising unemployment rates in Germany, 
especially  in  the  New  Laender.  In  reunified  Germany,  unemployment  increased  from  8.1 
percent by the  end of 1993 to 8.8 percent in 1998 and 9.4 percent in 2003.
19 Typically, 
patterns concerning the income shares can also be reconfirmed for each of our sub-samples, 
although  amplitudes  of  changes  are  typically  higher  in  case  of  the  New  Laender.  The 
aggregate effect of changes in the income shares on inequality is the share effect. Comparing 
years 1993 and 1998, it is high and positive, small and negative between 1998 and 2003. This 
means that changes in the income shares increased inequality between 1993 and 1998, but had 
an inequality reducing effect between 1998 and 2003. 
There are no apparent patterns concerning inter-temporal differences of concentration 
coefficients in reunified Germany. Most remarkably is the high positive value for ‘income 
from employment’ concerning the period 1993 to 1998, indicating that this income source 
over time became more unequally distributed. Interestingly, the same difference is negative 
for the two sub-samples of pensioners and non-pensioners. Then ‘income from employment’ 
should  have  become  more  unequally  distributed  between  non-pensioners  and  pensioners. 
Indeed, between 1993 and 1998 the difference in ‘income from employment’ (price-adjusted) 
between these two sub-samples increased by €831, from €22,394 in year 1993 to €23,225 in 
1998.  The  concentration  coefficient  of  ‘income  on  investments’  also  incurs  a  substantial 
increase between 1993  and 1998 of 4.20 percentage points, indicating  that especially the 
financially better-off benefit from higher returns from capital in this period. Bearish stock 
markets lead to an inverse effect between 1998 and 2003. The aggregate measure of inter-
temporal changes in the concentration coefficients on inequality is the concentration effect. 
Comparing 1993 and 1998 for reunified Germany, the concentration effect is small, even 
negative in case of non-pensioners (irrespective of the place of residence). However, it is 
always positive concerning the years 1998 and 2003, indicating increasing inequality levels 
within the income sources themselves. 
  Table 11b contains all necessary information concerning the pre-reunification period 
in the Old Laender. Altogether, the distribution in the Old Laender is rather stable over time. 
However,  between  1983  and  1988  inequality  drops  noticeably.  Basically,  this  can  be 
                                                 
18 At year-end, the German stock index was 1,328 points in 1988;  2,267 points in 1993; 5,002 points in 1998; 
3,965 points in 2003.   
19  All  numbers  according  to  the  ILO  unemployment  concept.  Data  can  be  downloaded  from  the  German 
Statistical Office.   16 
explained  by  a  decreasing  share  of  the  rather  unequally  distributed  ‘income  from 
employment,’ in combination with falling concentration coefficients of ‘retirement incomes’ 
and ‘income from investments.’ The decreasing share of ‘income from employment’ can be 




Table 11.a-c about here 
 
Sample composition 
We next turn to the question as to whether the composition of the elderly population has 
changed  over  time.  We  are  especially  interested  in  average  age  and  in  the  fraction  of 
pensioners in the entire elderly population. Both statistics are provided in Table 12. The first 
column gives the average age in the (sub-)samples over the observation period. For both the 
period before and after reunification, we find that our sample ages slightly. Average age rises 
from  67.37  to  67.68  between  1978  and  1988,  falls  to  an  average  of  67.20  years  after 
reunification  (1993)  and  then  again  rises  to  68.11  years  in  2003.  In  the  three  adjacent 
columns, we provide fractions of pensioners among German elderly. In reunified Germany, 
the share of pensioners is increasing in accordance with sample ageing. Only focusing on the 
Old Laender, the share of pensioners drops slightly from 81.95 percent in 1978 to 78.80 
percent in 1998, and then sharply increases to 82.10 percent in 2003. In 2003, almost the 
entire Old Laender cohort C2, receives retirement incomes (99.26 percent of the sub-sample), 
compared to 96.81 percent in 1978. It is interesting to note that even in case of cohort C1, the 
fraction of pensioners is more than 50%, despite noticeable replacement rate reductions in 
recent  years. In case of the New Laender, these fractions are still higher. This especially 
applies to the cohort C1. In case of this sub-sample, the share of pensioners sharply rises from 
49.23 in year 1993 to 66.74 percent in 1998, and slightly falls to 63.25 percent in 2003. 
Obviously, early retirement facilities are still advantageous for many insurants, particularly in 
the New Laender, where favourable early retirement regulations were implemented to reduce 
official unemployment rates.  
 
Table 12 about here 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
This paper has described the financial situation and income inequality among German elderly 
over  the  period  1978  to  2003,  using  harmonized  cross-sectional  German  Sample  Survey   17 
Income data. To our knowledge, this is the first longitudinal analysis providing comparable 
estimates for Germany at such a level of detail. Our findings, therefore, throw new light on 
the incomes of the elderly over a period where Germany experienced both, long stable phases 
of income growth, recessions, significant changes in the basic conditions due to population 
ageing and the German reunification, and a flood of major and minor pension reforms.  
  Our findings document that the incomes of the elderly increased substantially during 
the two and a half decades we have studied, especially in the New German Laender. From all 
income sources, ‘income on investments’ increased most significantly. Income growth rates 
were remarkably stable for retired, but quite volatile in case of non-retired elderly. In this 
sense, the German pension system is an effective insurance device against aggregate GDP 
shocks. Concerning the issue of income inequality, we find that the income distribution of the 
elderly is both rather stable and flat. In the Old Laender, the Gini coefficient indicates slightly 
less inequality in recent years. In the New German Laender, however, inequality increased 
significantly since reunification, conforming to the Old Laender level. From the distinguished 
five  income  sources,  the  distribution  of  ‘incomes  from  employment’  and  ‘income  from 
investments’  are  most  uneven,  whereas  ‘retirement  incomes,’  especially  PAYG  pensions, 
have an inequality reducing effect.   
  Recent reforms of the German pension system include a paradigm shift towards a 
more funded pension scheme and a raise of the retirement age from 65 to 67. To compensate 
for the resulting lowering of future replacement rates, in year 2001 the German government 
started to promote the development of private pensions by means of special saving subsidies 
and tax incentives (Riester-scheme). As the Gini elasticity with respect to PAYG pensions is 
negative and positive with respect to ‘income on investments,’ these reform measures are 
likely to increase income inequality among elderly in the future. Moreover, recent work has 
shown that the Riester-scheme, so far, has neither increased the fraction of households with 
positive savings, nor saving rates (for details see Corneo et al., 2007). It is, therefore, likely 
that old-age poverty will become a more important issue in future decades. We hope that our 
work can serve as a useful yardstick for evaluating the pros and cons of the implemented and 
scheduled pension-system reforms. 
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 Table 1. Equivalent incomes and equivalent-income shares, 2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners  income source 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
total gross mean equivalent income      26,752  28,122  20,563  24,748  25,818  20,104  36,336  38,687  23,263 
total share  1 w   20.69  21.58  15.16  6.73  6.87  5.99  66.14  66.61  61.75 
self-employed income  11 w   4.02  4.38  1.83  1.66  1.84  0.68  11.71  12.14  7.67 
incomes from 
employment 
earned income  12 w   16.66  17.20  13.33  5.07  5.03  5.31  54.43  54.47  54.08 
total share  2 w   53.34  51.20  66.57  67.77  65.80  78.74  6.33  6.50  4,73 
PAYG  21 w   36.33  31.89  63.77  47.49  42.31  76.33  0.00  0.00  0.00 
other pensions  22 w   2.46  2.54  2.00  1.32  1.29  1.47  6.20  6.37  4.66 
company pensions  23 w   4.29  4.95  0.24  5.57  6.52  0.28  0.13  0.13  0.07 
retirement 
incomes 
civil servant’s pensions  24 w   10.25  11.82  0.55  13.39  15.68  0.66  0.00  0.00  0.00 
total share  3 w   2.31  1.94  4.59  1.36  1.17  2.41  5.40  4.29  15,64 
former employment related benefits  31 w   1.32  1.04  3.09  0.47  0.35  1.14  4.12  3.16  13.00 
social assistance  32 w   0.27  0.27  0.26  0.15  0.16  0.11  0.65  0.60  1.05 
family-related benefits  33 w   0.04  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.14  0.15  0.06 
transfers 
other benefits  34 w   0.67  0.59  1.22  0.73  0.65  1.16  0.50  0.39  1.52 
income on investments  4 w   16.16  17.30  9.13  17.24  18.68  9.16  12.67  13.07  8.98 
other incomes  5 w   7.51  7.98  4.55  6.90  7.48  3.70  9.47  9.53  8.90 
Note. All shares are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension fund; 
µ: unconditional mean equivalent income; wi: income share of main income aggregate i; wij: income share of income sub-aggregate j concerning i.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 2. Conditional means of equivalent income in 2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners 
income source 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
self-employed income  14,328  15,207  7,734  7,765  8,220  4,238  23,535  25,092  12,330  incomes from 
employment  earned income  15,569  16,707  10,090  6,774  7,074  5,538  25,682  27,147  17,093 
PAYG  12,439  11,713  15,387  12,439  11,713  15,387  ---  ---  --- 
other pensions  7,799  8,314  5,248  4,533  4,667  3,975  15,565  16,132  10,783 
company pensions  3,672  3,788  761  3,657  3,771  736  9,178  10,768  2,521 
Retirement 
incomes 
civil servant’s pensions  20,819  20,824  20,259  20,819  20,824  20,259  ---  ---  --- 
former employment related benefits  6,877  7,421  5,971  5,080  5,438  4,573  7,911  8,453  6,914 
social assistance  2,016  2,284  1,160  1,261  1,429  639  3,699  4,408  2,000 
family-related benefits  1,707  1,715  1,550  1,212  1,208  1,299  1,984  2,001  1,666 
Transfers 
other benefits  3,450  3,157  4,756  3,323  3,041  4,682  4,216  3,935  5,064 
income on investments  5,779  6,362.41  2,788  5,743  6,360  2,733  5,945  6,374  3,116 
other incomes  3,602  3,845.70  2,137  3,383  3,638  1,893  4,256  4,458  2,938 
Note. Conditional means are calculated if household units where the respective income share is positive. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New 
Laender; PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension fund. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 3. Mean equivalent incomes by age cohorts in 2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners 
income source    age 
cohort  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
C1  30,549  32,529  21,293  26,241  27,708  20,067  36,515  38,911  23,403 
total gross mean equivalent income     
C2  24,186  25,113  20,093  24,158  25,078  20,119  28,494  29,842  7,806 
C1  7.07  7.54  3.71  2.58  2.86  1.01  11.53  11.95  7.69  self-employed income  11 w  
C2  1.42  1.58  0.55  1.27  1.40  0.55  21.51  21.87  0.00 
C1  33.65  34.11  30.41  12.32  11.98  14.27  54.89  54.96  54.23 
incomes from 
employment 
earned income  12 w  
C2  2.16  2.25  1.66  1.96  2.01  1.65  28.59  29.01  4.41 
C1  18.32  15.83  36.14  36.73  32.62  60.63  0.00  0.00  0.00 
PAYG  21 w  
C2  51.70  46.09  82.67  52.10  46.51  82.73  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C1  4.14  4.22  3.62  2.05  1.90  2.90  6.23  6.40  4.68 
other pensions  22 w  
C2  1.03  1.06  0.89  1.00  1.03  0.89  4.69  4.77  0.00 
C1  2.57  2.89  0.29  5.04  5.83  0.43  0.12  0.12  0.07 
company pensions  23 w  
C2  5.77  6.77  0.22  5.80  6.82  0.22  0.78  0.79  0.00 
C1  7.08  7.96  0.80  14.20  16.41  1.35  0.00  0.00  0.00 
retirement 
incomes 
civil servant’s pensions  24 w  
C2  12.95  15.22  0.38  13.05  15.36  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C1  2.73  2.09  7.31  1.29  0.92  3.43  4.17  3.20  13.04  former employment related benefits   31 w  
C2  0.12  0.11  0.21  0.12  0.10  0.21  1.02  1.04  0.00 
C1  0.29  0.27  0.41  0.12  0.12  0.16  0.46  0.42  0.77 
social assistance  32 w  
C2  0.25  0.26  0.17  0.16  0.18  0.09  11.22  9.79  94.92 
C1  0.08  0.09  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.14  0.15  0.06 
family-related benefits  33 w  
C2  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.32  0.33  0.00 
C1  0.61  0.53  1.16  0.73  0.70  0.91  0.48  0.37  1.53 
transfers 
other benefits  34 w  
C2  0.73  0.63  1.26  0.73  0.63  1.26  1.21  1.23  0.00 
C1  14.83  15.56  9.63  17.08  18.29  10.06  12.59  12.98  9.00 
income on investments  5 w  
C2  17.30  18.84  8.78  17.30  18.85  8.79  17.17  17.46  0.00 
C1  8.61  8.91  6.50  7.83  8.34  4.86  9.40  9.45  8.92 
other incomes  5 w  
C2  6.56  7.16  3.22  6.51  7.10  3.23  13.50  13.71  0.67 
Note. Shares are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension fund; µ: 
unconditional mean equivalent income; wij: income share of income sub-aggregate j concerning i. C1: cohort age 55 – 64; C2: cohort age 65 and older. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. Table 4. Equivalent incomes by deciles in 2003 
Decile  income source 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
mean gross equivalent income  9,758  13,852  16,445  18,762  20,984  23,544  26,843  31,682  39,966  65,659 
total share  4.54  4.88  6.21  6.06  7.53  9.13  15.34  20.87  28.15  40.13 
self-employed income   0.94  0.84  1.11  1.18  1.15  1.32  1.72  2.90  3.09  10.63 
incomes from 
employment 
earned income  3.60  4.04  5.10  4.88  6.38  7.81  13.62  17.97  25.06  29.50 
total share  67.22  74.21  74.45  73.53  72.75  67.54  59.99  52.38  44.69  27.51 
PAYG  64.74  68.62  67.62  65.65  61.46  54.10  41.99  27.99  17.50  7.85 
other pensions  0.67  1.71  1.30  1.50  1.92  2.67  3.12  2.99  3.12  2.64 




civil servant’s pensions  0.58  0.76  1.90  2.27  4.99  5.66  9.74  15.96  18.78  13.63 
total share  14.87  5.29  2.67  2.15  1.53  2.31  2.52  1.67  1.44  0.78 
former employment related benefits  8.60  3.80  1.86  1.48  1.09  1.35  1.34  1.05  0.39  0.30 
social assistance  5.58  0.60  0.08  0.13  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01 
family-related benefits  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.07 
transfers 
other transfers  0.68  0.88  0.73  0.52  0.35  0.86  1.12  0.57  0.95  0.40 
income on investments   7.68  11.12  13.00  14.34  14.42  17.01  17.75  18.38  16.78  17.95 
other incomes  5.69  4.49  3.67  3.92  3.77  3.99  4.38  6.70  8.95  13.64 
Note. Unconditional means are calculated for the whole sample including household units where the respective income share is zero. Abbreviations denote the following:  
PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension fund. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 





















overall sample  82.71  81.88  34.21 
1  79.10  76.55  42.94 
2  90.27  77.64  33.56 
3  92.74  75.66  30.03 
4  92.46  73.09  31.12 
5  92.40  72.52  29.59 
6  90.16  78.79  30.76 
7  84.24  84.11  41.45 
8  79.14  90.45  47.75 
9  69.86  93.81  52.94 
10  56.68  96.13  63.11 
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  N: number of 
artificial one-member household units; P: pensioners; NP: non-pensioners; OL: Old Laender; NL: 
New Laender; C1: Cohort age 55 – 64; C2: Cohort age 65 and older.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
 
Table 6. Gini coefficients in 2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners  age cohort 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
all  30.12  30.77  21.63  27.05  27.89  19.16  34.96  34.01  31.78 
C1  33.05  32.75  27.08  28.81  28.90  23.13  34.55  33.54  31.56 
C2  26.40  27.54  17.45  26.18  27.30  17.37  50.43  49.66  5.65 
Note. Gini coefficients are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; 
PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension fund; C1: Cohort age 55 – 64; C2: Cohort age 65 and older. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
  Table 7: Inequality decomposition by income sources in 2003  
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners  Income source 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
total  1 C   63.97  63.53  60.64  58.88  57.49  66.50  41.72  40.20  43.58 
self-employed income  11 C   72.32  72.19  59.03  72.83  71.10  79.60  56.81  56.95  38.59 
incomes from 
employment 
earned income  12 C   61.96  61.33  60.87  54.30  52.50  64.81  38.48  36.47  44.29 
total  2 C   13.15  13.84  9.69  18.22  19.74  10.98  20.53  15.96  34.05 
PAYG  21 C   -4.44  -5.66  7.65  1.38  0.95  9.41  ---  ---  --- 
other pensions  22 C   42.70  40.11  49.89  36.95  34.02  51.15  19.81  15.10  34.82 
company pensions  23 C   33.84  28.49  39.24  40.50  35.85  45.21  55.73  57.42  -18.05 
retirement 
incomes 
civil servant’s pensions  24 C   59.76  54.65  86.55  66.84  62.57  88.06  ---  ---  --- 
total  3 C   -13.64  -14.96  -3.88  5.91  0.79  24.10  -41.13  -41.69  -24.13 
former employment related benefits   31 C   -22.75  -18.08  -25.36  -7.61  0.89  -14.73  -43.59  -43.49  -27.92 
social assistance  32 C   -79.31  -79.19  -85.42  -70.13  -69.97  -79.98  -82.54  -84.22  -78.77 
family-related benefits  33 C   61.38  0.57  78.09  58.89  53.28  94.64  35.77  30.67  51.75 
transfers 
other benefits  34 C   25.36  0.14  67.39  29.25  16.63  71.80  11.25  11.27  43.07 
income on investments  4 C   37.93  35.41  38.22  40.10  37.78  40.59  31.64  29.20  28.65 
other incomes  5 C   53.98 51.82 58.89 54.26 52.01  60.29 45.22 43.72 50.16
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension 
fund; Ci: concentration coefficient of main income aggregate i; Cij: concentration coefficient of income sub-aggregate j concerning i.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
 
 
  Table 8. Gini elasticities in 2003 
  pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners  income scource 
  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
total  1 η   23.26  22.98  27.34  7.92  7.28  14.80  12.79  12.13  22.91 
self-employed income  11 η   5.64  5.89  3.17  2.81  2.85  2.15  7.32  8.19  1.64 
incomes from 
employment 
earned income  12 η   17.62  17.09  24.17  5.11  4.43  12.65  5.47  3.94  21.27 
total  2 η   -30.05  -28.18  -36.76  -22.12  -19.24  -33.61  -2.61  -3.45  0.34 
PAYG  21 η   -41.69  -37.75  -41.22  -45.07  -40.87  -38.82  ---  ---  --- 
other pensions  22 η   1.03  0.77  2.61  0.48  0.28  2.46  -2.69  -3.54  0.45 




civil servant’s pensions  24 η   10.08  9.17  1.65  19.70  19.49  2.37  ---  ---  --- 
total  3 η   -3.36  -2.89  -5.41  -1.06  -1.13  0.63  -11.76  -9.55  -27.52 
former employment related benefits  31 η   -2.33  -1.65  -6.72  -0.60  -0.33  -2.02  -9.25  -7.19  -24.43 
social assistance  32 η   -0.97  -0.96  -1.30  -0.54  -0.56  -0.55  -2.17  -2.09  -3.67 
family-related benefits  33 η   0.05  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.04 
transfers 
other transfers  34 η   -0.11  -0.32  2.58  0.06  -0.26  3.18  -0.34  -0.26  0.54 
income on investments  4 η   4.20  2.61  6.99  8.31  6.62  10.25  -1.20  -1.85  -0.88 
other incomes  5 η   5.95  5.46  7.84  6.94  6.46  7.94  2.78  2.72  5.14 
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; PAYG: retirement pensions from public pension 
fund; ηi: Gini elasticity of main income aggregate i; ηij: Gini elasticity of income sub-aggregate j concerning i. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 9. Income growth rates, 1978-2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners    age cohort 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
all  15.57  13.59  33.18  19.58  17.51  41.37  11.78  7.62  21.40 
C1  14.13  12.55  22.03  19.60  19.36  28.01  12.16  7.89  22.10  100 1
1993










C2  19.80  16.97  48.30  19.96  17.09  48.53   -2.29  1.05  -54.29 
all    37.60      42.56      24.78   
C1    26.54      31.56      20.46    100 1
1978










C2    47.07      47.78      47.03   
all  5.15  4.50  7.15  9.12  8.31  11.71  0.36  0.94  -7.02 
C1  3.10  2.33  -0.46  7.36  6.50  2.70  0.31  0.89  -6.79  100 1
1998










C2  10.78  9.77  18.72  10.74  9.71  18.82  15.29  16.53  -44.06 
all  9.91  8.69  24.29  9.58  8.49  26.55  11.38  6.62  30.57 
C1  10.70  9.99  22.59  11.40  12.08  24.64  11.81  6.94  30.99  100 1
1993










C2  8.15  6.56  24.91  8.32  6.72  25.01  -15.25  -13.28  -18.30 
all    9.98      9.67      7.42   
C1    6.14      3.08      6.43    100 1
1988










C2    13.31      13.19      39.17   
all    9.76      9.31      13.73   
C1    8.01      8.78      5.11    100 1
1983










C2    12.88      10.47      132.96   
all    0.35      1.19      -5.09   
C1    -1.93      -1.71      -0.20    100 1
1978










C2    -1.70      0.94      -55.12   
Note. All incomes in 2003 prices. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; C1: cohort age  
55 – 64; C2: cohort age 65 and older; µt: total gross mean equivalent income in period t. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1978-2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 10. Trends in inequality, 1978-2003 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners  year  age cohort 
OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
all  30.12  30.77  21.63  27.05  27.89  19.16  34.96  34.01  31.78 
C1  33.05  32.75  27.08  28.81  28.90  23.13  34.55  33.54  31.56  2003 
C2  26.40  27.54  17.45  26.18  27.30  17.37  50.43  49.66  5.65 
all  30.74  31.17  23.32  26.97  27.63  19.81  33.32  32.52  31.40 
C1  32.30  32.15  26.33  27.31  27.75  21.76  33.16  32.33  31.29  1998 
C2  26.64  27.36  17.86  26.52  27.24  17.80  39.75  39.12  32.69 
all  31.32  31.21  20.71  27.43  27.37  16.56  35.15  33.64  26.51 
C1  32.90  32.49  23.32  26.77  26.71  17.75  34.84  33.22  26.51  1993 
C2  27.83  27.79  15.36  27.59  27.52  15.34  52.82  53.09  23.32 
all    31.13      27.55      32.84   
C1    31.59      27.06      32.09    1988 
C2    27.50      27.19      48.72   
all    33.26      29.17      36.38   
C1    31.84      27.93      31.10    1983 
C2    30.81      29.06      65.80   
all    33.14      29.89      33.07   
C1    31.97      29.04      30.38    1978 
C2    30.30      29.45      49.68   
Note. Gini coefficients are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following: OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; C1: 
cohort age 55 – 64; C2: cohort age 65 and older. 
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1978-2003. Own calculations. 
 
  Table 11a. Inequality Decomposition 1993-2003, Old and New Laender 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners   
1998-1993  2003-1998  1998-1993  2003-1998  1998-1993  2003-1998 
change in Gini
  G     -0.58  -0.62  -0.47  0.08  -1.83  1.64 
income from employment  1 w     -0.58  -5.43  -1.27  -1.65  -5.64  -3.26 
retirement incomes  2 w     -2.59  6.74  -3.94  2.37  -6.20  5.64 
transfers  3 w     -4.55  -0.85  0.21  -0.47  1.45  -1.01 
income on investments  4 w     0.57  -0.83  0.81  -1.12  1.72  -0.99 
other incomes  5 w     1.08  0.36  4.18  0.87  8.67  -0.37 
income from employment  1 C     5.49  -1.84  -0.92  -5.84  -6.72  2.82 
retirement incomes  2 C     -2.60  5.55  -1.94  1.39  28.31  22.96 
transfers  3 C     -2.07  -9.83  12.64  0.29  -2.39  -7.24 
income on investments  4 C     4.20  -1.47  -1.68  -2.60  -3.74  -0.27 
other incomes  5 C     -1.89  5.87  20.80  11.32  12.46  3.02 
share effect  SE  25.53  -2.88  0.19  -0.67  1.87  -0.90 
concentration effect  CE  0.21  2.26  -0.65  0.76  -3.71  2.54 
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  wi: change of share of main income aggregate i;  Ci: change 
of the concentration coefficient of main income aggregate i.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1998 and 2003. Own calculations. Table 11b. Inequality Decomposition 1978 – 2003, Old Laender 
































  G     0.13  -2.13  0.08  -0.04  -0.40  -0.73  -1.62  -0.18  0.27  0.26  3.31  -3.54  -0.81  -1.12  1.48 
income from employment  1 w     -0.43  -2.12  1.01  -3.28  -4.97  -0.75  -1.59  0.07  -2.05  -1.04  -1.68  -1.53  -0.34  -8.94  -3.03 
retirement incomes  2 w     -1.74  1.17  -2.59  -4.11  6.48  -1.18  0.50  -2.13  -3.92  2.05  -1.15  0.99  -0.16  -1.87  5.78 
transfers  3 w     -0.49  0.34  0.37  0.11  -0.65  -0.68  0.00  0.01  -0.03  -0.29  -0.03  1.26  1.12  0.29  -0.89 
income on investments  4 w     2.65  0.10  4.31  1.43  -1.22  2.62  0.21  5.13  1.38  -1.57  2.82  -0.26  2.46  1.79  -1.44 
other incomes  5 w     0.01  0.50  -3.10  5.85  0.35  -0.01  0.87  -3.08  4.62  0.85  0.05  -0.46  -3.08  8.74  -0.43 
income from employment  1 C     -1.18  0.44  -1.60  -1.15  -1.96  -2.12  0.54  -4.40  0.36  -7.30  2.46  -1.81  1.60  -2.04  2.50 
retirement incomes  2 C     -0.09  -1.35  -1.03  -1.55  5.44  -0.82  -1.12  -0.94  -0.78  1.26  24.33  -14.73  0.95  -9.53  23.39 
transfers  3 C     -14.72  2.72  2.97  7.82  -12.85  -23.09  8.96  6.25  13.31  -5.61  -1.96  -13.06  1.25  5.97  -8.78 
income on investments  4 C     4.29  -2.63  2.19  -1.35  -0.70  3.54  -2.40  3.71  -1.07  -1.76  6.83  -1.73  -1.61  -1.99  0.19 
other incomes  5 C     -3.15  -3.25  -14.62  26.50  7.30  -4.54  -2.44  -16.99  21.96  12.41  -0.77  -1.22  5.57  12.62  5.37 
share effect  SE  0.49  -1.14  1.15  -0.19  -2.70  0.27  -0.59  0.81  -0.19  -0.47  0.20  -1.12  -0.50  -0.18  -1.20 
concentration effect  CE  -0.36  -0.99  -1.07  0.16  2.29  -1.00  -1.03  -0.99  0.45  0.73  3.11  -2.42  1.31  -0.94  2.68 
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  wi: change of share of main income aggregate i;  Ci: change of the concentration 
coefficient of main income aggregate i.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1998 and 2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 11c. Inequality Decomposition 1993 - 2003, New Laender 
pensioners & non-pensioners  pensioners  non-pensioners   
1998-1993  2003-1998  1998-1993  2003-1998  1998-1993  2003-1998 
change in Gini
  G     2.62  -1.69  3.26  -0.66  4.90  0.38 
income from employment  1 w     3.55  -8.32  3.75  -4.97  18.71  -5.70 
retirement incomes  2 w     -11.39  8.66  -8.49  4.46  -38.35  4.28 
transfers  3 w     3.13  -2.05  1.21  -1.41  10.96  -0.88 
income on investments  4 w     1.17  1.35  1.27  1.07  0.55  2.29 
other incomes  5 w     3.54  0.36  2.25  0.85  8.13  0.02 
income from employment  1 C     -9.83  -6.73  -1.63  -6.62  -19.23  2.00 
retirement incomes  2 C     -1.88  6.97  -2.48  2.87  18.92  24.17 
transfers  3 C     7.01  -7.95  23.41  5.71  -5.39  -1.65 
income on investments  4 C     7.23  -1.23  7.02  -2.74  7.13  2.70 
other incomes  5 C     44.19  -3.01  44.69  5.16  38.22  -9.35 
share effect  SE  4.00  -4.05  3.31  -2.41  10.65  -0.65 
concentration effect  CE  -1.38  2.36  -0.05  1.75  -5.76  1.03 
Note. All numbers are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  wi: change of share of main income aggregate i;  Ci: change 
of the concentration coefficient of main income aggregate i.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1998 and 2003. Own calculations. 
 Table 12. Trends in the composition of the elderly population, 1978-2003 
( ) P P NP N N N +   year  age cohort  average 
sample age  OL&NL  OL  NL 
all  68.11  82.71  82.10  85.46 
C1  59.79  58.07  56.96  63.25  2003 
C2  73.73  99.35  99.26  99.79 
all  67.23  79.58  78.80  82.99 
C1  59.43  56.62  54.00  66.74  1998 
C2  73.94  99.36  99.29  99.73 
all  67.20  79.25  80.06  75.32 
C1  59.14  54.53  55.73  49.23  1993 
C2  73.80  99.45  99.37  99.89 
all  67.68    81.55   
C1  59.46    58.54    1988 
C2  73.89    98.93   
all  67.55    80.33   
C1  59.34    60.90    1983 
C2  74.05    95.72   
all  67.37    81.95   
C1  59.08    58.67    1978 
C2  72.66    96.81   
Note.  All ratios are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  N: 
number of artificial one-member household units; P: pensioners; NP: non-
pensioners; OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; C1: cohort age 55 – 64; C2: 
cohort age 65 and older.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 2003. Own 
calculations. 





Into Effect   Reform act  Individual pension level 
1977  01/1978 -  
01/1979 
20nd Rentenanpassungsgesetz  Reduced assessment of education and training periods for future pension claims 
1978  07/1978 - 
12/1981 
21nd Rentenanpassungsgesetz  Pensions grow less than gross wages 
1982  01/1983  Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1983  Further reduction of assessment of education and training periods for future pension claims  
1985  01/1986  Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen bei den 
Hinterbliebenenrenten  
Equal treatment of widows and widowers, and reduction of  surviving dependants’ 
pensions beyond specified income levels 
1989  01/1992  Rentenreformgesetz 1992  Further reduction of assessment of education and training periods for future pension claims 
Stepwise increase of retirement age 
Increase of minimal term of insurance  
Change of pension adjustment procedure to net pension adjustment 
Introduction of adjustment costs for retirement before age 65 
1996  10/1996 
01/1997 
Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz  Further reduction of assessment of education and training periods for future pension claims 
Stepwise process of retirement age is accelerated 
1997  07/1998 - 
01/2000 
Rentenreformgesetz 1999  Introduction of a ‘demographic factor’ to link pensions with demographic change 
Increase of retirement age and lowering of pension levels for several insurant segments (in 
particular for highly disabled and surviving dependants) 
1998  04/1999 - 
06/1999 
Rentenkorrekturgesetz   Adjournment of the Rentenreformgesetz 1999 until Dec. 31, 2000 
1999  04/1999  Gesetz zur Neuregelung der geringfügigen 
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse  
Tax exceptions for active pensioners 
1999  01/2000  Gesetz zur Sanierung des Bundeshaushalts  Change of pension adjustment procedure to adjustment according to inflation 
2001  01/2001 - 
01/2002 
Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz  No pension adjustment for year 2001 
2001  01/2002  Gesetz zur Verbesserung des Hinterbliebenenrechts  Increase of surviving dependants’ pensions Table A2. Unweighted number of observations, 1978-2003 
unweighted number of observations as share of sample size 




OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL  OL&NL  OL  NL 
all  100.00  79.43  20.57  77.17  61.07  16.10  22.83  18.36  4.47 
C1  49.40  38.89  10.51  26.93  20.88  6.05  22.47  18.02  4.46  2003  26,504 
C2  50.60  40.53  10.07  50.24  40.19  10.05  0.36  0.34  0.02 
all  100.00  76.66  23.34  75.40  56.75  18.64  24.60  19.90  4.70 
C1  54.38  40.57  13.81  30.03  20.90  9.13  24.34  19.67  4.67  1998  28,923 
C2  45.62  36.08  9.54  45.36  35.85  9.51  0.26  0.23  0.03 
all  100.00  78.91  21.09  73.80  60.12  13.68  26.20  18.78  7.41 
C1  51.99  38.35  13.65  26.15  19.90  6.26  25.84  18.45  7.39  1993  23,004 
C2  48.01  40.56  7.45  47.65  40.23  7.42  0.36  0.33  0.03 
all    100.00      77.51      22.49   
C1    49.64      27.63      22.00    1988  24,988 
C2    50.36      49.88      0.49   
all    100.00      75.75      24.25   
C1    52.04      31.05      20.99    1983  24,375 
C2    47.96      44.71      3.25   
all    100.00      77.60      22.40   
C1    46.97      26.09      20.88    1978  29,087 
C2    53.03        51.51        1.52    
Note. Shares are reported in percent. Abbreviations denote the following:  OL: Old Laender; NL: New Laender; C1: cohort age 55 
– 64; C2: cohort age 65 and older.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1978-2003. 
  
 Table A3. Consumer-price indices for Germany  
Year  OL  NL 
1978  54.36  --- 
1983  68.92  --- 
1988  73.05  --- 
1993  86.08  85.09 
1998  93.54  94.62 
2003  100.00  100.00 
Note. For 2003, consumer-price indices are available for the 
whole of Germany only. 
Source.  Own  calculations  from  data  of  German  Federal 
Statistical Office (2007b). 
 Table A4. EVS income variables  
EVS field-identification number   income source  components 
2003  1998  1993  1988  1983  1978 
earned income
a 99; 100; 102; 103; 104; 
108; 133 
251-256; 258-263; 272-
277; 279-284; 286-291; 
314-319; 405-410 
303-308; 429-434  186; 188; 190; 192; 299-
304 
187; 189; 191; 193; 300-
305 






income  122; 123; 124  328-333; 335-340; 342-
347 
324-329; 331-336; 338-
343; 345-351; 352-357; 
359-364 
194-199; 201-206; 208-
213; 215-220; 222-227; 
229-234 
195-200; 202-207; 209-
214; 216-221; 223-228; 
230-235 
157-162; 164-169; 171-
176; 178-183; 185-190; 
192-197 




















pensions  160; 130; 131  580-585; 384-389; 391-
396 
541-546; 548-553; 387-
392; 394-399; 401-406 
404-409; 411-416; 278-
283; 285-290; 292-297 
398-403; 405-410; 279-






other pensions  132; 147; 150; 156  398-403; 503-508; 524-
529; 559-564 
408-413; 415-420; 422-
427; 485-490; 492-497; 
513-518 
257-262; 264-269; 271-
276; 362-367; 369-374 
258-263; 265-270; 272-
277; 356-361; 363-368 
220-225; 227-232; 234-









438; 440-445; 496-501; 
552-557 
436-441; 443-448; 450-
455; 592; 593; 478-483; 
506-511 
306-311; 313-318; 320-
325; 455; 466; 334-339; 
348-353 
307-312; 314-319; 321-
326; 448; 459; 328-333; 
342-347 
269-274; 276-281; 283-
288; 394; 410; 325-330; 
311-316 
social 
assistance  141; 143; 144; 157  461-466; 475-480; 482-
487  589; 464-469; 596; 597  452; 355-360; 456; 467  445; 349-354; 449; 460  391; 318-323; 395; 411 
family-related 
benefits  139; 140; 142; 145  447-452; 454-459; 468-
473; 489-494  588; 457-462; 471-476  451; 341-346; 327-332  444; 335-340  390 
transfers 
other transfers  151
 b; 152; 153; 154  531-536
 b; 538-543; 
545-550  499-504; 600; 601  376-381; 459; 470;  370-375; 452; 463  325-330; 398; 414 
income on investments  47; 177; 162  121; 617; 594-599  103; 614; 625  24; 453; 488  33; 446; 481  388; 389; 392; 426 
other incomes  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Note. ‘Other incomes’ is the income residual that cannot be assigned to the eleven other income sources. 
a In 1978, 1983 and 1988 ‘earned income’ is reported for the household head, 
the spouse (if present), and ‘children’ (if present). For ‘other’ household members, only an aggregate amount is reported. In this case, we divide the aggregate amount by the number 
of ‘other’ household members and assign this ratio to each household member age 55 and above that is not the household head and not his/her spouse.
 b Although this position should 
be classified as ‘other pensions’ we reclassify it for reasons of better comparison as ‘other transfers’.  
Source. German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures 1978-2003. 
 
 
 